I guess I’ve always been confused by the Many Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Physics and the fact that it’s taken seriously. Like is there any proof at all that universes outside of our own exist?
I admit that I might be dumb, but, how does one look at atoms and say “My God! There must be many worlds than just our one?”
I just never understood how Many Worlds Interpretation was valid, with my, admittedly limited understanding, it just seemed to be a wild guess no more strange than a lot things we consider too outlandish to humor.
But they are all observed, that’s the point.
By who? If I measure the spin of an electron in a superposition of up and down, I only ever get one result, up or down.
By the versions of you in each branch.
But which one am I? You postulate that “I” am somehow split into endless copies upon observation, but also “I” am only one of those copies somehow chosen at randomly according to the wave function distribution. So “I” see all outcomes of the experiment but “I” also only see one of them?
This is where it stops being simple to me.
What you are describing is essentially another facet of The Vertiginous Question - why am I me instead of someone else. Importantly, this is a problem that exists regardless of whether MWI is true or not, so the lack of simplicity already exists, like it or not.
Before you were born, the future contained the creation of a vast number of conscious beings, but only one of them would be “you”, seemingly chosen at random.
The branching of the observers wave function is exactly the same situation.
It’s a question about Philosophy of Consciousness, which is well and truly outside the purview of Quantum Physics. From the scientific perspective it’s perfectly logical and sufficient to say that “there is one observer who will split into many, each of which will have its own perspective that is unaware of the others”.
I think you misunderstood, it’s not the Vertiginous Question, it’s simply about describing an experiment.
I perform an experiment to empirically investigate something, this process depends on me subjectively experiencing the result of the experiment. Before the observation, the system is in superposition, afterwards it appears to not be in my subjective experience. Collapse theories have to add a postulate that something happened upon observation to change the system. MWI has to add a postulate that some mechanism placed me in a certain branch of the possible outcomes. Neither is necessarily simpler than the other.
Whether other versions of me with their own subjective experience observed something else or not, you need to add that postulate. Their observations are irrelevant empirically, and saying “you actually observed all outcomes” is just factually wrong from an empirical viewpoint.
All results of the experiment will be experienced by a future version of you.
No, this is definitely the Vertiginous Question. The “mechanism” that puts you in a certain branch is the same one puts you in a certain body. Are you also going to demand that neuroscientists answer the Vertiginous question before they can say that other people exist?
That “postulate” already exists if you believe in consciousness in the first place.
Literally the opposite: empiricism requires objectivey, trying to insist that only the things that you personally subjectively experience counts is as far from that as you can get.